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Abstract—NTRU cryptosystem has allowed designing a
range of cryptographic schemes due to its flexibility and effi-
ciency. Although NTRU cryptosystem was introduced nearly
two decades ago, it has not yet received any attention like
designing a secret key encryption. In this paper, we propose a
secret key encryption over NTRU lattices, named as NTRUCi-
pher. This NTRUCipher is designed using modification of the
NTRU public key encryption. We analyze this cipher efficiency
and the space complexity with respect to security aspects,
and also show that the NTRUCipher is secured under the
indistinguishability chosen plaintext attack.
Key words - NTRUCipher; multiple transmission attack;
product form polynomials; secret key encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptosystem is classified as the secret key cryptosys-
tem (symmetric key cryptosystem) and public key cryp-
tosystem (asymmetric cryptosystem) based on nature of
cryptographic key functions and properties. The secret key
cryptosystem could be categorized as the stream cipher and
block cipher based on size of the secret key, plaintext and
ciphertext. The block ciphers are the most influential crypto-
graphic primitives in designing cryptographic schemes such
as encryptions, hash functions, and message authentication
codes. In the secret key encryption, communication parties,
a sender and receiver share and use a common key, as the
secret key, whereas in the public key cryptosystem both
the sender and receiver contain their own secret key and
associated public key. The secret key cryptosystem provides
cryptographic services such as confidentiality, integrity and
authentication of a message. The strength of the secret key
encryption relies on two parameters: strength of algorithm
and length of the secret key. The well known secret key
block ciphers are the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[10], RC5 [15], Blowfish [3], Data Encryption Standard
(DES) [2], and International data encryption algorithm
(IDEA) [17]. These ciphers are built using Feistel net-
work except IDEA for encryption and decryption. The
Feistel network [7] was designed using XOR operator and
Permutation-Box (P-Box) and Substitution-Box (S-Box).
The proposed cipher presented in this paper is designed
using a modification of the NTRU public key cryptosystem
[8] over the ring, R = Zq[x]/(x
n − 1), where n is a
prime and q is a power of 2. The NTRU public key
cryptosystem was first appeared in [8] due to Hoffstein
et al. in 1998 and it is based on truncated polynomials
over finite fields. Most of the promising candidates of the
NTRU cryptosystems are NTRUEncrypt [8] and NTRUSign
[9] which are resistance to the Shor’s algorithm [14] on
quantum computers. Damien Stehle et al. proposed a prov-
able security version of the NTRU public key cryptosystem
over the ring, R = Zq[x]/(x
n + 1), where n is a power
of 2 and q is a prime, which provides encryption [5,6] and
digital signature [6]. There is still scope to work further
on their contribution in terms of setting up a specific
security parameters. Recently, Daniel J Bernstein et al.
proposed another variant of the NTRU, named as NTRU
Prime [4], over the ring, R = Zq[x]/(x
n − x − 1), where
n is a prime and q is a power of 2. In this work, we
propose lattice based secret key encryption over NTRU
lattices, named as NTRUCipher. The framework of the
encryption and decryption is the same as NTRUEncrypt [8]
and the decryption is a probabilistic like the NTRUEncrypt
[8]. Furthermore, we prove the NTRUCipher is secured
under the indistinguishability chosen plaintext attack (IND-
CPA), and analyze efficiency and the space complexity with
respect to security aspects.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we
recall the definition of a secret key encryption and adversary
model. Section III presents truncated polynomial rings. In
Section IV, we propose the NTRUCipher - lattice based
secret key encryption and recommend parameters for the
cipher. In Section V, we analyze the NTRUCipher with
respect to performance, security aspects, and space and
time complexity. Finally, we provide conclusion remarks
in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this Section, we recall the formal definition of a secret
key encryption and its security notations.
A. Notations
A real valued function ǫ(c) < c−λ is negligible if for
every λ > 0 there exists cλ > 0 such that ǫ(c) < c
−λ
for all c > cλ. A probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
is said to be efficient if its running time is polynomial
in its input length. We represent x a random variable
sampled from the probability distribution D as x ← D.
The effectiveness of an algorithm to distinguish between
two probability distributions D0 and D1 is measured by
its distinguishing advantage, defined by |Prx←D0 [A(x) =
1]− Prx←D1 [A(x) = 1]|. We say that a decision problem
is hard if there does not exist an efficient algorithm for
it that has a non-negligible advantage in λ. The statistical
distance △(D0;D1) between two distributions D0, D1 on
some countable domain X is defined as △(D0;D1) =
|D0(x) −D1(x)|.
B. Secret Key Encryption
The goal of the secret key encryption is to furnish
confidentiality of communications of two or more parties.
In the secret key encryption, a common secret key is shared
among the communication parties, before decryption of the
ciphertext, to furnish confidentiality of the plaintext. The
following definitions are acquired from [12,13]. For further
details, the reader is referred to [12,13].
Definition 1. A secret key encryption SE =
(KeyGen, Enc,Dec) consists of the following three
algorithms:
(i) Key Generation: Key Generation (KeyGen) is a
randomized algorithm that outputs a random key. When the
algorithm is run, a different key is generated every time.
Note that in this case, the input for the algorithm is a null.
The randomized output secret key is represented with a
dollar symbol $:
1: Input: null
2: k
$←− KeyGen(1λ)
(ii) Encryption : Encryption (Enc) is a randomized
algorithm that takes a plaintext µ and the secret key k as
input, and outputs a ciphertext c.
1: Input: µ ∈ Dµ, k ∈ Dk, where Dµ is the plaintext
space, Dk is the secret key space and secret key k is
generated by the KeyGen(1λ) algorithm.
2: c
$←− Enc(µ, k), otherwise Φ if µ /∈ Dµ) ∀c ∈ Dc,
where Dc is the ciphertext space.
(iii) Decryption : Decryption (Dec) is a deterministic
algorithm.
1: Input: c ∈ Dc, k ∈ Dk, where Dc is the ciphertext
space and k is the secret key, generated by theKeyGen(1λ)
algorithm.
2: µ← Dec(c, k) ∀c ∈ Dc.
Correctness of the secret key encryption works as
follows: We say that a secret key encryption SE =
(KeyGen, Enc,Dec) is correct, if it holds for every
plaintext µ that Pr[Deck(Enck(µ)) 6= µ : k $←−
KeyGen(1λ)] < negl(λ).
C. Security Notations
The aim of an adversary A is to capture the secret key
of the secret key encryption and then perceive the plain-
text corresponding to the ciphertext. We assume that the
adversary does not have prior knowledge of the secret key
k. The indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack or
IND-CPA security is defined as follows:
Definition 2. Let A be an adversary. Let SE =
(KeyGen, Enc,Dec) be the secret key encryption. Let us
define the following experiment between a challenger and
A:
Experiment: IND-CPAbSE(A)
1: The challenger runs k
$←− KeyGen(1λ).
2: A outputs a pair of plaintexts (µ0, µ1) of the same
length and sends (µ0, µ1) to the challenger.
3: The challenger computes c∗
$←− Enc(µb, k) and then
sends c∗ to the adversary.
4: A continues its computation and outputs : b′ .
5: Output 1 if b = b
′
, and 0 otherwise.
Definition 3. A secret key encryption SE =
(KeyGen, Enc,Dec) is indistinguishable under chosen
plaintext attack, if it holds for all probabilistic polynomial
time adversary A that
AdvIND−CPASE (A) = |Pr[ExpIND−CPASE (A) = 1]− 12 | ≤
negl(λ).
III. TRUNCATED POLYNOMIAL RINGS
Let q ∈ N be a prime. We write Zq for the integer modulo
q and represents this set by integers in the range (− q2 , q2 ).
The truncated polynomial ring Rn,q = Zq[x]/(x
n + 1)
consists of all polynomials with coefficients in Zq and
degree less than n. An element f ∈ Rq is represented as a
polynomial,
f =
n−1∑
i=0
fix
i = [f0, f1, ....., fn−1].
Two polynomials f, g ∈ Rq are multiplied by the ordi-
nary convolution,
(f ∗ g)k =
∑
i+j≡k(mod n)
(fi.gj), k = 0, 1, ..., n− 1, which
is commutative and associative. The convolution product is
represented by * to distinguish it from the multiplication in
Zq . We define a center l2−norm of an element f ∈ Rq by
‖f‖2 = (
N−1∑
i=0
fi − f¯)1/2, where f¯ = 1N
N−1∑
i=0
fi and the
infinity norm is ‖f‖∞ =max0≤i≤n−1
f
fi
f
.
Lemma 1[14,15]. For any f, g ∈ Rn,q = Zq[x]/(xn+1),f
f.g
f ≤ √n. f f f . f g f and f f.g f∞ ≤ n.
f
f
f
∞ .
f
g
f
∞ .
A. Cryptographic Assumptions
In this Subsection, we define the NTRUCipher ciphertext
cracking problem for which the parameters are chosen
as recommended in the table 1. The search and decision
ciphertext cracking problems are defined as follows:
1) Search NTRUCIpher Ciphertext Cracking Problem:
Given c = r ∗ k−1 + µ(mod q) ∈ Rn,q , with r $←
Pn(a1, a2, a3), k
$← Pn(a1, a2, a3) , compute (r, k, µ).
2) Decision NTRUCIpher Ciphertext Cracking Problem:
Given c = r ∗ k−1(mod q) ∈ Rn,q, distinguish whether c is
sampled from the distribution D0 = {c = r ∗ k−1(mod q) :
r
$← Pn(a1, a2, a3), k $← Pn(a1, a2, a3)} or from the
uniform distribution D1 = U(Rn,q).
We assume that the decision NTRUCipher Ciphertext
Cracking Problem is hard to indistingush computationally.
IV. NTRUCIPHER
In this Section, we propose NTRUCipher which is drawn
from NTRUEncrypt [2,4] by modification. In this cipher,
we use a ring of Rn,q = Zq[x]/(x
n + 1) and propose
NTRUCipher-lattice based secret key encryption.
System Parameters: The cipher would have three integer
parameters, n, p and q. The integer n has to be 2l , p is a
small prime, and q is large prime such that gcd(p, q) = 1 ,
and p < q.
Table I
NTRUCIPHER - SYSTEM PARAMETERS
1. n- Degree Parameter
2. q - Large Modulus
3. Ring Parameters, Rn,q =
Zq [x]
(xn+1)
4. p - Plaintext space modulus
5. a1, a2, a3 - Non-zero coefficient counts for
product form polynomial terms.
6. µ - Plaintext .
7. c - Ciphertext
8. k - Secret key
9. r - Ephemeral key
10. Dµ - Plaintext space
11. Dc - Ciphertext space
12. Dk- Secret key space
13. Dr- Ephemeral key space
14. Bn ={Binary Polynomials}
15. Tn ={Ternary Polynomials}
16. Tn(a, e) ={Ternary polynomials with exactly
a ones and e minus ones}
17. Pn(a1, a2, a3) ={Product form of
polynomials A1 ∗A2 +A3 : Ai ∈ Tn(ai, ai)}
(i) Key Generation: 1. The secret key k is a polynomial
of the form p.k
′
+1, where k
′
is generated by product form
of polynomials, Pn(a1, a2, a3). Note that this form ensures
that k has inverse 1 modulo p.
Algorithm 1 NTRUCipher-Key Generation
Input: A set of system parameters
1: repeat
2: k
′ $← Pn(a1, a2, a3)
3: k = 1 + p.k
′ ∈ Rn,q
4: until k is invertible in Rn,q
Output : Secret key k.
(ii) Encryption :
1) To encrypt a plaintext µ ∈ {−(p − 1)/2, ..,+(p −
1)/2}n with the secret key k, first a polynomial r
is randomly sampled in Pn(a1, a2, a3) such that r ∗
k−1(mod q) ∈ Rn,q .
2) Compute ciphertext c = (p.r ∗ k−1 + µ)(mod q).
Algorithm 2 NTRUCipher-Encryption
Input: Secret key k, message µ ∈ {−(p− 1)/2, ..,+(p−
1)/2}n, and set a parameter, p = 3.
1: repeat
2: r
$← Pn(a1, a2, a3)
3: c = (p.r ∗ k−1 + µ)(mod q) ∈ Rn,q
Output : Ciphertext c
(iii) Decryption : To decrypt the ciphertext c with respect
to the secret key k,
1) Compute first ciphertext, c
′
= c∗k(mod q), and center
the coefficient of c
′
in (−q/2, q/2).
2) Then, compute µ
′
= c
′
(mod p), and center the
coefficient in (−p/2, p/2) to get the plaintext µ.
Algorithm 3 NTRUCipher-Decryption
Input: Secret key k, Ciphertext c ∈ Rn,q , and set a
parameter, p = 3.
1: c
′
= c ∗ k(mod q) ∈ Rn,q
2: Center the coefficients of c
′
in (−q/2, q/2)
3: µ
′
= c
′
(mod p)
4: Center the coefficients of µ
′
in (−p/2, p/2)
5: Result = µ
Output : Plaintext µ
Completeness: To decrypt the ciphertext c with respect
to the secret key k,
1) Compute first cipher text c
′
= c ∗ k(mod q) =
(p.r + µ ∗ k)(mod q), and center the coefficient of
c
′
in (−q/2, q/2).
2) Then, compute µ
′
= c
′
(mod p) = [p.(r + µ ∗ k′) +
µ](mod p) , and center the coefficient in (−p/2, p/2)
to get the plaintext µ.
A. Probability of decryption failure
In this subsection, we estimate decryption failure of
the NTRUCipher in terms of probability. For a successful
decryption of the ciphertext c for the plaintext µ using the
given secret key k, the coefficient of the c
′
= [p.(r + µ ∗
k
′
)+µ] must be in the range of less than q2 . By the triangle
inequality, the following relation holds:f
c
′ f
∞ 6 p.(
f
r
f
1 +
f
µ
f
∞
f
k
′ f
1) + 1] .
We assume that r and k
′
are chosen in the product
form and the plaintext µ is a ternary polynomial. Note
that the decryption failure can be avoided by ensuring
q > 8p(2a1a2 + a3) + 2 . We hereby set a probabilistic
bound to estimate the probability;
Prob(a given coefficients of r+µ∗k1 has absolute value
≥B ).
We choose r and k
′
in the product form such that r = r1∗
r2+r3, k
′
= k
′
1∗k
′
2+k
′
3, where each ri and k
′
i has exactly ai
coefficients equal to 1, ai coefficients equal to -1 and the rest
of the coefficients equal to 0. When the coefficients of the
plaintext µ are chosen from {−(p− 1)/2, ..,+(p− 1)/2}n,
the probability of taking 0 as coefficients of plaintext µ
is
aµ
n , and taking ±1 as coefficients is (1 −
aµ
n ). The
coefficients of r + µ ∗ k1 are expected to be distributed
according to the convolution of normal distribution with
standard deviation, σ =
√
(4a1a2 + 2a3)(2− aµn ), which
is computed by adopting technique of section 6 of [11].
The probability that a normally distributed random vari-
able with mean 0 and standard deviation σ exceeds B in
absolute value is given by the complementary error function,
erfc(B/(
√
2σ). Thus, the probability that any of the n
coefficients of r + µ ∗ k′ is greater than B is bounded by
n.erfc(B/(
√
2σ). With respect to security parameter λ this
imposes the constraint n.erfc((q − 2)/(2√2pσ) < 2−λ,
where σ = σ(n, a1, a2, a3, aµ).
B. Parameter Sets and Sample space
In this Subsection, we give set of parameters for the
NTRUCipher. We discuss how the NTRUCipher parameters
are chosen.
1) Binary polynomials: Binary polynomials Bn are used
in this cipher to generate product form of polynomials.
These can be easy to implement in software and hardware.
A disadvantage is that binary polynomials are by definition
unbalanced. Therefore, when k(1) 6= 0, as a consequence
information on the plaintext µ, namelyµ(1) leaks.
2) Ternary polynomials: We define Tn as the set of
all ternary polynomials, a particular case Tn(a, e) with a
coefficients are 1, e coefficients are −1 and rest of the
coefficients are 0. These ternary polynomials are used to
make product form of polynomials.
3) Product form of polynomials: Product form of poly-
nomials Pn are generated by Pn(a1, a2, a3) = {a1∗a2+a3 :
a1 ∈ Tn(a, e), a2 ∈ Tn(a, e), a3 ∈ Tn(a, e)}. These
polynomials are used in this cipher to choose the secret
key k and ephemeral key r. For instance, the secret key k is
chosen of the form k = 1+p.k
′
, where k
′ ∈ Pn(a1, a2, a3).
The number of non-zero coefficients in k
′
and r are crucial
for the performance of the encryption. Note that convolution
can be faster if there are a small number of non-zero
elements in the polynomial. An advantage of the product
form of polynomials is that they allow for exceptionally
fast convolution without Fourier transforms.
4) Secret Key Space: The space of secret key Dk consists
of all polynomials that are derived from Pn(a1, a2, a3). If
n and q are fixed in advance, we can choose a1, a2 and a3
with ±1’s for the secret key k. When we take a1 ≈ a2 ≈
a3, the expected number of non-zero coefficients in k are
4a1a2+2a3 ≈ 2n3 which is an optimal for key selection. The
space complexity of the secret key is O((2
f
k
f
∞+1)
n).
The size of the secret key is n⌊log2(2
f
k
f
∞+1)⌉.
5) Ephemeral key space: The space of ephemeral key
Dr consists of all polynomials that are derived from
Pn(a1, a2, a3). The space complexity of the ephemeral key
is O((2
f
r
f
∞+1)
n). The size of the ephemeral key is
n⌊log2(2
f
r
f
∞+1)⌉.
6) Plaintext space: The plaintext space Dµ is defined
as Dµ = {µ ∈ Rn,q/µ has coefficients in (− p−12 , p−12 )},
assuming p is odd prime. The recommended parameter, p =
3. The space complexity of the plaintext space is O(pn).
The size of the plaintext is n⌊log2p⌉.
7) Ciphertext space: The ciphertext space Dc is defined
as Dc = {c ∈ Rn,q/c has coefficients in (− q−12 , q−12 ),
assuming q is odd prime. The complexity of the ciphertext
space is O(qn). The size of the ciphertext is n⌊log2q⌉.
C. Efficiency.
We provide efficiency of the NTRUCipher in terms of
O notations. In this NTRUCipher, we can perform addition
and multiplication of two polynomials over the ring, Rn,q =
Zq[x]/(x
n + 1) in O(n) and O(n2⌊log2q⌉) bits operations
respectively. Thus, it follows that the cost of encryption and
decryption in both cases is O(n2⌊log2q⌉) bit operations.
D. Concrete Parameters Set
Our recommendations for parameters of the NTRUCipher
suggests taking n = 256, p = 3, q = 1087 , a1 = 5, a2 =
5, a3 = 5, and aµ = 102 so that we will ensure upper
bound on the security parameter that our decryption failure
probability is less than 2−80.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
1) Brute-force attack: Brute-force attack is one of the
generic cryptographic attacks in which one could try for
every possible key permutation until it finds the secret key.
The feasibility to find out the secret key in brute force attack
relies on key space. In this cipher, the key space order for n
bit length is O((2
f
k
f
∞+1)
n). In the proposed cipher, we
use minimum key length of 256 bits. Therefore, one should
try (2
f
k
f
∞+1)
256 bit permutations to find the secret key
which is large enough for brute force attack. The plaintext
µ is chosen as a polynomial with ternary coefficients of
degree 256 in the NTRUCipher, one should try 3256 bit
permutations to find the plaintext µ on the brute force attack.
According to knowledge of the author, currently complexity
order 280 is considered as the lower bound of security for
brute force attack.
2) Multiple transmission attack: In this NTRUCipher,
one would send a single plaintext µ multiple times using the
same secret key k and different ephemeral keys, r’s. In this
scenario, one would transmit t ciphertexts such that ci =
p.ri ∗ k−1 + µ(mod q) for i = 1, 2, 3...., t. The adversary
can then compute (ci− c1) = (ri− r1) ∗ k−1(mod q). Note
that c = r∗k−1(mod q) , where c = ci−c1 and r = ri−r1,
has same structure as the public key generation of the
NTRUEncrypt [2,4]. Since c = r∗k−1(mod q), there exists
u ∈ Rn,q with u = −k∗c+rq such that [k, u].Lc = [k, r],
where Lc =
[
I c
0 qI
]
. By choosing the appropriate
parameters for [k, r], one can find the secret key k by
solving SVP (approximate SVP) in Lc.
3) Chosen Plaintext attack: In chosen plaintext attack,
the adversary can randomly choose plaintexts to be en-
crypted and gets corresponding ciphertexts. The goal of the
attack is to get access to the information that reduces the
security of the secret key encryption. We hereby prove the
NTRUCipher is indistinguishability chosen plaintext attack-
secure. We use the following game IND-CPA between a
challenger and an adversary.
Theorem 1. The NTRUCipher-Lattice based secret key
encryption is INA-CPA Secure if the decision NTRUCipher
ciphertext cracking problem is hard.
Proof: Let A be an adversary. A is given random oracle
access to NTRUCipher− Enc(.) and outputs two plain-
texts µ0, µ1 of equal length of n and sends to a challenger.
The challenger runs an algorithm C and picks b← {0, 1},
and computes challenging ciphertext c∗ = (p.r∗ ∗ k∗−1 +
µb)(mod q) instead of c = (p.r ∗ k−1 + µ)(mod q). Then,
the challenger sends the challenging ciphertext c∗ to the
adversary A. Eventually, when the adversary A outputs his
guess b
′
for b , the algorithm C outputs 1 if b
′
= b, and 0
otherwise.
We now compute advantage function of the ad-
versary under indistinguishability (IND) chosen plain-
text attack(CPA) experiment: AdvIND−CPANT RUCipher(A) :=
|Pr[ExpIND−CPANT RUCipher(A) = 1] − 12 |. We say that
the NTRUCipher satisfies IND-CPA, if the advantage
AdvIND−CPANT RUCipher(A) is negligible for any polynomial time
adversary A.
If we fix k∗ ∈ Rn,q, the encrypted oracle uses the value
r∗ to answer at least one of the n queries of A. Let qn
denote the total number of queries made by A. In this
experiment, A can succeed by one of the two possibilities.
If r∗ is drawn from D0 for some queries of A, then A
succeeds and the algorithm C returns 1 with probability is
at most qe(2
f
r∗
f
∞
+1)n . If r
∗ is drawn from D1 for some
queries of A, then A succeeds only by guessing b, and
the algorithm C returns 1 with probability 12 . Thus, we
have Pr[ExpIND−CPANT RUCipher(A) = 1] ≤ 12 + qe(2 f r∗ f
∞
+1)n .
The advantage of the adversary of the NTRUCipher,
AdvIND−CPANT RUCipher(A) := |Pr[ExpIND−CPANT RUCipher(A) = 1] −
1
2 |≤ 12 + qe(2 f r∗ f
∞
+1)n − 12 ≤ qe(2 f r∗ f
∞
+1)n ≤ negl(λ).
Therefore, the NTRUCipher is IND-CPA secure.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a secret key encryption
which is based on truncated polynomials over NTRU lat-
tices instead of classical well known Feistel structure [7].
Attacks such as brute force attack, multiple transmission
attack and IND-CPA have been exposed against the pro-
posed NTRUCipher. We have also recommended a set of
parameters and analyzed security aspects and efficiency. A
disadvantage of the NTRUCipher is that size of ciphertext
is very larger compared to other existing secret key block
ciphers [2,10]. Further work is required for designing the
NTRUCipher based homomorphic secret key encryption and
message authentication code.
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